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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE-AN INTRODUCTION
FREDRIC I. LEDERER*

"Scientific evidence" has a ring of impressive probative force, a
ring that would appear to find a receptive ear in a public blas6
with technological achievement. Exposed by prime time television
to crack medical examiners, youthful computer wizards, and experts of every kind, many members of the public may assume that
scientific evidence is the mainstay of forensic investigation. Although scientific evidence occupies a significant place in contemporary litigation,1 the use of novel or particularly sophisticated scientific evidence is far less commonplace or decisive than the
entertainment media suggest.
Despite its comparatively limited role, the use of sophisticated
scientific evidence is increasing at a rapid rate.2 To many legislators, judges, and lawyers, scientific evidence is an Aladdin's lamp:
used properly, scientific evidence promises great benefit; used im* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. B.S. 1968, Polytechnic Institute of New York; J.D. 1971, Columbia University; LL.M. 1976, Umversity of
Virginia.
1. "In a recent survey of judges and attorneys by the National Center for State Courts,
forty-four percent of those responding stated that they encountered scientific evidence in at
least thirty percent of their cases." Imwmkelned, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific
Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY Lf
REV. 261 (1981) (citing Study to Investigate Use of Scientific Evidence, NAT'L CENTER ST.
CTs. REP., Aug. 1980, at 1).
2. This is particularly true, of course, in the numerous administrative and civil cases
growing out of attempts to protect both the environment and the consumer. See generally
Markey, Jurisprudenceor "Junscienee'?,25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 525 (1984).
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properly, it threatens not only individual cases, but potentially the
entire judicial system.
In the past, science fiction authors often predicted a future in
which criminal trials would be replaced by some form of scientific
factfinder, often a computerized lie detector. Perhaps we should be
encouraged that we have reached the milestone year of 1984 without having relegated our counsel and judges to the technological
breadlines. The dilemma of how to handle scientific evidence in
the courtroom, however, remains real. Indeed, as our technology
advances, resolution of the problems posed by novel scientific evidence becomes increasingly important.
Scientific evidence has been unevenly received. In an increasing
number of civil and administrative cases, scientific evidence is not
only material, but critical. In criminal cases, however, an apparent
dichotomy is present. Although many courts have accepted not
only recent developments, such as neutron activation analysis, S but
even the polygraph,4 other courts have refused to avail themselves
of such fruits of contemporary science as the psychology of eyewitness identification. 5 Under these circumstances, a Symposium on
scientific evidence is particularly appropriate. The unusually broad
and far reaching scope of this Symposium airs many of the
problems presented by scientific evidence.
The threshold issue in any exploration of scientific evidence is
the jurisprudential role of science. In Jurisprudence or "Juriscience"?,O Chief Judge Howard Markey of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reflects upon what he views as a
national tendency for legislators and courts to abdicate their policymaking and interpretative duties in favor of often ill-defined,
value-free scientific principles. Judge Markey emphasizes two distinct concerns. The first is the tendency of Congress and many

3. See A.
1978).

MOENSSENS

& F. INBAU, ScmNrrc

EvDENCE IN CRMNAL CASES §

9.03 (2d ed.

4. See State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975); State v. Renfro, 28 Wash. App.
187, 622 P.2d 1295 (1981). New Mexico even admits evidence of the results of psychological
stress evaluators. Simon Neustadt Family Center v. Bludworth, 97 N.M. 500, 641 P.2d 531
(Ct. App. 1982).
5. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 448 A.2d 253, 258 (D.C. 1982); Johnson v. State, 438
So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 1983).
6. 25 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 525 (1984).
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state legislatures to legislate broad social goals, such as clean air,
without adequately addressing the ultimate need to balance those
goals against numerous competing policy considerations. As a result, the courts must grapple with fundamental policy questions
that are more properly resolved by the legislature. Judge Markey's
second concern is with the judicial tendency to accept scientific evidence uncritically-a tendency due to an unwarranted belief in
science per se, or to the present nature of the adversarial system
which, complicated by the limited scientific education of many
judges, makes obtaining and evaluating a sufficient quantity of accurate and intelligible evidence difficult. An abdication of a court's
interpretative and factfinding roles in favor of scientific experts
will indeed yield "juriscience" and is improper. Such a result is
difficult to forestall, however, given the courts' frequent need to
determine scientific "truth" in order to apply the law properly.'
At the same time, lawyers generally lack significant scientific
training. This educational deficiency often places lawyers at a disadvantage when confronted with scientific evidence. As Judge
Markey notes, lawyers-whether serving as counsel or
judges-often fail to ask the right questions and uncritically accept
scientific assertions." In Scientific Evidence and the Question of
Judicial Capacity,10 one of two student contributions to this Symposium, the author addresses judicial competency to deal with sci7. Judge Markey also despairs of the judicial refusal to make policy judgments when
forced to resolve litigation involving such statutes. Although policy considerations cannot be
avoided in all cases, the function of a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature. In addressing the various state laws requiring the wearing of motorcycle helmets,
for example, Judge Markey effectively commends those courts that considered whether the
"underlying values of our jurisprudence" supported those statutes rather than merely accepting statistical evidence concerning potential injuries to helmetless riders. Id. at 531-33.
Such an inquiry, however, is the function of the legislature in considering and enacting a
statute. Absent constitutional implications, the proper function of a court is not to determine whether fundamental principles of jurisprudence should invalidate a statute regardless
of the potentially inadequate legislative policy consideration. The court's function is to determine whether the statute is constitutional, not whether it is desirable.
8. When a statute mandates a general goal such as clean water, for example, the only
question theoretically before the court is whether a given technological approach is scientifically justified.
9. Id. at 529-32. Rejecting other proposed solutions, Judge Markey suggests a revision of
prelaw and science curricula and the promulgation of "Rules of Technological Adjudication". Id. at 539-42.
10. 25 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 675 (1984).
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entific evidence and the related topic of making scientific evidence
intelligible to a jury.11
If scientific evidence is desirable or inevitable, one must define
the standard and procedure for determining its admissibility.
Merely making such a statement, however, poses the basic problem. Should scientific evidence be evaluated under the normal
standards of logical relevancy, 12 or should special rules apply? In
resolving this issue, one must distinguish between novel scientific
evidence and scientific evidence of proven validity. Any consideration of the admissibility of novel scientific evidence necessarily requires a discussion of the Frye rule,13 which prohibits the admission of novel scientific evidence unless its underlying principle "is
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs. 1

4

Although in decline, the

Frye rule clings tenaciously to life and has been the subject of
great scholarly debate. 5 Professor Andre Moenssens, one of the
nation's leading scientific evidence experts, contributes to that debate in The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative
to the Frye Rule."6 Concluding that the Frye rule should be abandoned, Professor Moenssens advises the courts to take an approach
that concentrates on assessing, in an effective and realistic manner,
the reliability of a technique and proposes a new procedure to facilitate the court's reliability determination.
11. Id. Professor Doyle, however, suggests that juries may not be as easily swayed or confused as conventional wisdom would suggest. Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the PrejudicialEffects of Admitting and Excluding Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 Wm.& MARY L. Rav. 619 (1984).

He observes:
Ironically, the expert scientific witness, characterized in judicial opinions as
the invulnerable magician, Merlin, often appears in the memoirs of legendary
trial lawyers exposed as either Rube Goldberg, fabricating ever more fantastic
devices, or Dr. Pangloss, pompously offering increasingly inane opinions.

Id. at 640 (footnotes omitted). See generally Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting
Scientific Evidence: A Critiquefrom the Perspective of JurorPsychology, 28 VmL.L. REv.
554 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Fan. R. Evm. 401, 402.

13. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14. Id. at 1014.
15. See, e.g., Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980).

16. 25 Wm.& MARY L. Rv.545 (1984).
17. Id. at 567-68.
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Focusing on a different aspect of the same problem, Professor
Edward Imwinkelried, a noted and prolific commentator on the
subject of scientific evidence, explores the effects of the possible
demise of the Frye rule. In Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of PreliminaryFacts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?,18 he concludes that absent the Frye
rule, the Federal Rules of Evidence would require the factfinder to
determine the validity19 of the novel scientific evidence. Like Professor Moenssens, Professor Imwinkelried believes that, although
the Frye rule should be abolished, the court should continue to
determine the preliminary issue of the validity of the underlying
scientific theory. Accordingly, he proposes that the Federal Rules
of Evidence be amended to ensure that result.20 Professor Imwinkelried's analysis and evidentiary conclusions are convincing.2 1
Exposing jurors to a new theory at the cutting edge of science or
technology while asking them both to determine its validity and to
ignore the evidence should they find it invalid appears far too dangerous-at least in criminal cases. 22 Professor Imwinkelried's proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, therefore,
seems well taken. What is not clear is whether his amendment goes
far enough. Professor Giannelli has proposed that "[t]he prosecution in a crimnal case should be required to establish the validity
of a novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil litigants and criminal defendants, on the other hand, should estab18. 25 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 577 (1984).

19. Although courts use the terms "validity" and "reliability" interchangeably, the
terms have distinct meanings in scientific jargon. "Validity" refers to the ability of a test procedure to measure what it is supposed to measure-its accuracy. "Reliability" refers to whether the same results are obtained in each instance in which the test is performed-its consistency. Validity includes
reliability, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Giannelli, supra note 15, at 1201 n.20.
20. Interestingly, Professor Inwinkelried's evidentiary proposal and the procedural suggestions made by Professor Moenssens complement each other. If implemented, they would
greatly assist the court in determining the preliminary question of a scientific theory's
validity.
21. To the best of my knowledge, scholarly writing lacks a formal conflict of interest disclosure rule. Notwithstanding the nonapplication of rule 10(b)(5) or any equivalent, the
reader may wish to note E. IMwniNKA=n, P. G1uiN=, F. GMLGMAN & F. LDERE, CRn NAL EvDENcz (1979).
22. But see Doyle, supra note 11, at 636 (reasoning that juors may be able to evaluate
scientific evidence with a degree of skepticism ignored by conventional wisdom).
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lish the validity of a novel technique by a preponderance of the
evidence."2 s Professor Giannelli's position is somewhat demanding
of the prosecution, but does have the virtue of protecting a defendant from a conviction based upon invalid scientific theories.
New evidentiary tests and procedures for the admission of novel
scientific evidence may not solve all problems. One also must consider the direct and indirect costs that will arise from the increasingly routine resort to scientific evidence. Also worth considering is
whether the adversary system presently provides adequate alternatives to the use of expert testimony. In Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts About Trial Court
Analysis of the PrejudicialEffects of Admitting and Exclading
Expert Scientific Testimony,2 4 Professor James Doyle considers
the extent to which counsel may clarify or control the use of scientific evidence in court, as well as the extent to which counsel may
substitute more customary procedures for scientific evidence. Professor Doyle performs a valuable service because trial lawyers often
tend to seek expert testimony when counsels' skills alone might be
of at least equal value.
Professors Doyle, Moenssens, and Imwinkelried all note the
problems that have occurred with various forms of scientific evidence in even routine cases. In his earlier article in this Review, A
New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on
Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence,2 5 Professor Imwinkelried summarized the results of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's Proficiency Testing Program of over 200 forensic laboratories in the United States by stating: "It is an
understatement to say that the findings... are alarming. 'Shocking' would be more precise. ' 26 The degree of error found in the
testing program for many forms of routine analysis makes clear the
need for concern not only with novel scientific evidence, but with
the more customary forms as well. In Capabilities of Modern Forensic Laboratories,7 therefore, Dr. I.C. Stone not only offers an
insightful view of the capabilities of forensic laboratories, which
23. Giannelli, supra note 15, at 1248 (footnotes omitted).
24. 25 WM. & MARY L. Rlv. 619 (1984).

25. Imwinkelried, supra note 1.
26. Id. at 268 (footnote omitted).
27. 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 659 (1984).
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play an integral role in the presentation of scientific evidence, but
also illustrates the demands placed on forensic laboratories-demands that may be unreasonable in some cases. Similarly,
the second student contribution to this Symposium, Seeing Can
Be Deceiving: Photographic Evidence in a Visual Age-How
Much Weight Does It Deserve?,8 illustrates the difficulties that
can arise with noncontroversial and routine forms of evidence, such
as photographs, movies, and videotapes. The point should not be
ignored. Despite the importance of novel scientific evidence, the
great majority of cases using scientific evidence involve more customary forms, and the use of even this type of scientific evidence
leaves much to be desired. 9
Scientific evidence is a fascinating area that combines traditional
evidentiary questions with new and complex scientific problems. It
poses fundamental jurisprudential issues and hard questions of
trial practice. The questions are clear; the solutions are not. This
Symposium will facilitate the process of reaching those solutions.

28. 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 705 (1984).
29. Both Professor Moenssens' proposals for improvement and Professor Imwinkelried's
earlier suggestions for evaluating the weight of scientific evidence are helpful in this area.
See Imwinkelried, supra note 1; Moenssens, supra note 24. Professor Moenssens' suggestion
that forensic laboratory reports be expanded in criminal cases to include such information
as the identity and qualifications of the forensic examiners, the nature of the tests applied
and the results obtained, as well as the examiners' conclusions, could substantially improve
counsels' ability to cope with scientific evidence in criminal cases. See id. at 568-69. The
effect of limited conclusory laboratory reports is difficult to overestimate in jurisdictions
that permit the reports to be admitted in criminal cases as exceptions to the hearsay rule.

See, e.g., MAl. R. Evro. 803(6), 803(8).

